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TREATMENT OF A PROFESSIONAL DEGREE OR
LICENSE IN A MARITAL DISSOLUTION
Ron Nelson
I. INTRODUCTION
Marital dissolutions often involve heated disputes over the di-
vision of tangible property. Fortunately, the Montana Legislature
has provided a scheme for the division of tangible property.' The
problems involved in a marital dissolution increase significantly
when the dissolution occurs shortly after one spouse obtains a pro-
fessional degree or license. The Washington Supreme Court has
aptly described the typical situation:
A husband and wife make the mutual decision that one of them
will support the other while he or she obtains a professional de-
gree. The educational years will be lean ones for the family not
only because of the heavy educational expenses, but also because
the student spouse will be able to earn little or nothing. More-
over, the supporting spouse may be called upon to postpone his or
her own education or to forgo promotions and other valuable ca-
reer opportunities in order to find a job near the student spouse's
school. These sacrifices are made in the mutual expectation that
the family will enjoy a higher standard of living once the degree is
obtained. But dissolution of the marriage intervenes. Because the
family spent most of its financial resources on the degree, there
may be few or no assets to be distributed. The student spouse has
the degree and the increased earning potential that it represents,
while the supporting spouse has only a dissolution decree.'
The inherent equitable, legal, and practical problems involved in
this typical situation are obvious. Consequently, "[o]ne of the most
intensely debated issues in matrimonial law today is whether a
professional degree or license is property subject to equitable dis-
tribution upon divorce."3 The Montana Supreme Court has not
squarely addressed this issue. This comment surveys the positions
taken by other jurisdictions with respect to the treatment of a pro-
1. Montana has enacted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act which, inter alia, pro-
vides for the division of property upon dissolution. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-101 to 40-
4-225 (1985).
2. Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 173-74, 677 P.2d 152, 155 (1984).
3. Note, Matrimonial Law-Equitable Distribution-Nature of a Professional De-
gree-Traditional Alimony Can be Restructured to Provide Reimbursement to a Spouse
Who Supports His or Her Partner in the Quest for an Advanced Degree, 14 SETON HALL
437 (1984).
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fessional degree or license in a marital dissolution,4 and discusses
how present law in Montana may influence the Montana Supreme
Court.
II. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Although a large number of jurisdictions have addressed the
treatment of a professional degree or license in a marital dissolu-
tion, there is no uniform rule.5 Where the question is one of first
impression, supporting spouses have typically argued that a profes-
sional degree or license is property subject to equitable distribu-
tion. Courts rarely accept this argument. Only a few opinions and
notable dissents have adopted this position. On the other end of
the scale, only a few opinions completely disregard the existence of
a spouse's professional degree or license. The majority of cases
hold that a professional degree or license is not property, but pro-
vide for some consideration of the degree or license.
A. Professional Degree or License as Property
1. The Minority View: Existence of Property Rights in a Profes-
sional Degree or License
The obvious value of a professional degree or license is the en-
hanced earning capacity which attaches to the degree or license.' It
is this aspect of a professional degree or license which supporting
spouses seek to capture by characterizing a degree or license as
"property." As mentioned above, only a few cases and dissenting
opinions characterize a professional degree or license as "prop-
erty."7 Although these decisions clearly represent the minority po-
4. Several states now have statutes which specifically address the treatment of a pro-
fessional degree or license in a marital dissolution. Consequently, some of the case law men-
tioned in this article may be superceded by statute. Because Montana does not have a simi-
lar provision (and none is on the legislative horizon), this article will focus solely on the
judicial development of rules.
5. Comment, Equitable Interest in Enhanced Earning Capacity: The Treatment of a
Professional Degree at Dissolution, 60 WASH. L. REv. 431 (1984). Approximately 70 cases
have involved a determination of how to treat a professional degree in a marital dissolution.
Id. at 432 n.2,
6. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668,
678 (1979): "The value of a legal education lies in the potential for increase in the future
earning capacity of the acquiring spouse made possible by the law degree and innumerable
other factors and conditions which contribute to the development of a successful law
practice."
7. See In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) (Corrigan, J.,
dissenting); In re Marriage of Hortsmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Inman v. Inman,
578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979);
Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (Rossellini, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 47
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sition, they make strong arguments for characterization of a pro-
fessional degree or license as property.
An early Ohio Court of Appeals case provided the basis for
subsequent cases to hold that a professional degree or license may
be considered property. In Daniels v. Daniels,8 the husband had
acquired a medical degree and license during the couple's mar-
riage. At the time of dissolution, the couple possessed relatively
few tangible assets. In fact, the court noted that the principal mar-
ital asset was the husband's education.9 Consequently, the trial
court based its determination of alimony on the husband's future
earning capacity. Upholding the trial court's determination, the
Ohio Court of Appeals held, "[T]he right to practice medicine, be-
ing in the nature of a franchise, constitutes property which the
trial court had a right to consider in making the award of ali-
mony."'10 Although at the time of Daniels Ohio had a statute which
specifically provided for consideration of earning capacity in deter-
mining the amount of alimony granted,11 Daniels provided author-
ity for courts to hold that a professional degree or license may be
characterized as property subject to division in a marital
dissolution.
In In re Marriage of Hortsmann,12 the wife sought to charac-
terize the husband's law degree as property. The Iowa Supreme
Court did not expressly hold that a professional degree or license is
property subject to division upon dissolution. Instead, the court
held, "[I]t is the potential for increase in future earning capacity
made possible by the law degree and certificate of admission con-
ferred upon the husband with the aid of his wife's efforts which
constitutes the asset for distribution by the court.1 3 Thus, the
trial court properly considered the student spouse's future earning
capacity in determining a division of marital property or an award
of alimony.1 Hortsmann, nevertheless, is often cited for its holding
that a degree or license constitutes property.
Perhaps the strongest authority for characterization of a pro-
fessional degree or license as property is found in the dissenting
8. 20 Ohio App. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (1961).
9. Id. at -, 185 N.E.2d at 775.
10. Id.
11. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page 1980) provides: "The court of common pleas
may allow alimony as it deems reasonable to either party, having due regard to property
which came to either by their marriage, the earning capacity of either and the value of real
and personal estate of either, at the time of the decree."
12. In re Marriage of Hortsmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
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opinion of In re Marriage of Graham,15 the most frequently cited
case for the proposition that a degree or license does not constitute
property. 16 In Graham, the parties sought a joint dissolution after
six years of marriage. During the marriage the husband completed
his undergraduate degree and obtained an M.B.A. While the hus-
band completed his education, the wife was the principal wage
earner and took care of most of the family chores. At the time of
the dissolution proceeding, the couple had very few tangible assets.
Mrs. Graham claimed that the court should characterize her hus-
band's professional degree as property and divide it accordingly.
The trial court agreed with the wife and awarded her a lump sum
representing the value of her share of the degree. 7 The Colorado
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a degree is not property,
but that it may be considered in determining maintenance or an
equitable division of property.18
In an en banc hearing, the Colorado Supreme Court, by a 4-3
vote, held that the husband's professional degree could not be
characterized as property. 19 In the dissenting opinion, Justice Car-
rigan noted, "As a matter of economic reality the most valuable
asset acquired by either party during the six-year marriage was the
husband's increased earning capacity."20 He then redefined the is-
sue: "The issue . . . is whether traditional, narrow concepts of
what constitutes 'property' render the courts impotent to provide a
remedy for an obvious injustice. In cases such as this, equity de-
mands that courts seek extraordinary remedies to prevent ex-
traordinary injustice. 21 Justice Carrigan noted that Colorado has
long held that future earning capacity may be considered in deter-
mining property division and maintenance awards."
Like the court in Hortsmann, the minority in Graham held
that it is not the degree or license, but the enhanced earning ca-
pacity, which constitutes property.2 3 The minority then analogized
15. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) (en banc).
16. The majority's reasoning in holding that a professional degree or license does not
constitute property will be discussed infra.
17. The trial court determined the value of the husband's degree to be $82,836 and
awarded the wife $33,134 payable in monthly installments of $100.
18. Graham, 194 Colo. at 430, 574 P.2d at 75.
19. Id. at 432, 574 P.2d 77 (professional degree has none of the traditional attributes
of property).
20. Id. at 434, 574 P.2d 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
21. Id.
22. Id. The minority observed that the wife did not seek maintenance and presumably
would not be eligible for maintenance because she was capable of self-support. Id. at 435,
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the treatment of future earning capacity in other areas of the law.
It noted that in both tort and wrongful death actions, property
rights exist in an individual's future earning capacity. 4 Thus,
"[tihe day before the divorce the wife had a legally recognized in-
terest in her husband's earning capacity."2 5 Yet, upon dissolution
of the marriage, the nondegree spouse's interest in this asset
disappears.
Relying on the Graham dissent, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
also characterized a spouse's future earning capacity, derived from
the attainment of a professional degree or license during the course
of a marriage, as a marital asset subject to equitable division. In
Hubbard v. Hubbard,"' the Oklahoma court noted:
While it is true that Dr. Hubbard's license to practice medicine is
his own to do with as he pleases, it is nonetheless also true that
Ms. Hubbard has an equitable claim to repayment for the invest-
ment she made in his education and training. To hold otherwise
would result in the unjust enrichment of Dr. Hubbard. He would
leave the marriage with an earning capacity increased by
$250,000.00 which was obtained in substantial measure through
the efforts and sacrifices of his wife. She, on the other hand,
would leave the marriage without either a return on her invest-
ment or an earning capacity similarly increased through joint
efforts."
Recognizing that it would join a minority of jurisdictions, the court
chose to characterize the enhanced earning capacity of a spouse's
professional degree or license as marital property."
In addition to the above cases, two other opinions adopting
the minority position are noteworthy. In Inman v. Inman," the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that property rights may exist in
a professional degree or license. Like Hortsmann and the Graham
dissent, courts uniformly cite Inman as representative of the mi-
nority view. The dissenting opinion from a recent Washington
case, Washburn v. Washburn,30 may ultimately prove to be the
most persuasive authority in support of the minority position. Jus-
tice Rosellini, in his dissent, stated that he "would characterize the
professional education as a marital asset in the context of in-
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 603 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1979).
27. Id. at 750-51.
28. Id. at 751.
29. 578 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
30. 101 Wash. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
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creased earning capacity subject to distribution." 31 He argued that
other accepted positions fail to take into account the supporting
spouse's expectation of future economic benefit and that the ma-
jority view overstates the conceptual and practical problems of
valuation. 2
2. The Minority View: Valuation
Once a court recognizes property rights in a professional de-
gree or license, it must choose a method of valuation. Although
several methods have been suggested, the minority jurisdictions
have, for the most part, followed the method adopted by the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals in Inman. Under this method, the support-
ing spouse receives an amount equal to "the amount spent for di-
rect support and school expenses during the period of education,
plus reasonable interest and adjustments for inflation. s33 The mi-
nority view treats the supporting spouse's interest in the student
spouse's degree or license as an investment which the supporting
spouse may recapture along with inflationary growth and a reason-
able return.
Addressing the problem of valuation, the dissent in Washburn
recommended a method of valuation similar to that used in wrong-
ful death actions. Although Justice Rosellini looked to the nonstu-
dent spouse's expectation in contributing to the student spouse's
degree, he did not propose to rely on a quantitative determination
of the nonstudent spouse's contribution to the professional degree.
Instead, he proposed that the value of the degree or license be de-
termined by comparing "the student spouse's earning capacity at
the time of marriage with that at the time of dissolution or perma-
nent separation."3 4 Justice Rosellini noted that this method of val-
uation is common, and it presents problems with which the courts
have already dealt. "Because this method of calculation is akin to
the method used to ascertain damages for loss of earnings in a tort
or wrongful death action, a body of knowledge already exists in the
field of economics to make this type of determination. '35
31. Id. at 190, 677 P.2d at 164.
32. Id. at 191, 677 P.2d at 165.
33. Inman, 578 S.W.2d at 269.
34. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d at 192, 677 P.2d at 165 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). Justice
Rosellini also noted that with the passage of time after the degree is obtained, the nonstu-
dent spouse realizes increasing benefit from the professional degree or license. This realiza-
tion of benefit, he argued, should be taken into account in determining the nonstudent
spouse's share of the professional degree or license. Id. at 193, 677 P.2d at 165.
35. Id. at 193, 677 P.2d at 165-66.
[Vol. 47
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B. The Majority View: Professional Degree or License Is Not
Property
The courts generally base their refusal to characterize a
spouse's professional degree or license as property on a combina-
tion of factors. First, by its nature, a professional degree or license
is uniquely personal. Thus, it lacks one of the fundamental charac-
teristics of property-the ability to separate ownership from the
owner. Although a spouse may provide financial and emotional
support, the degree is largely the result of the student spouse's ef-
forts and background. The student spouse may sell or transfer the
product of his degree or license. Yet, he cannot sell or transfer his
education or the consequent enhanced earning capaicity. Second,
most courts are reluctant to treat the marital relationship as a bus-
iness venture. The majority of courts argue that characterizing the
professional degree or license as property would reduce the mar-
riage to an investment in which the nonstudent spouse invests in
the student spouse's education. Finally, the courts also emphasize
the speculative nature of a professional degree or license. It is, at
best, difficult to fix the future value of a professional degree or li-
cense. Further, if a court fixes the value of the student spouse's
degree or license before the benefits of the degree or license are
realized, the student spouse could be forced to pay for an asset
that may never exist.
Although most courts refuse to characterize a professional de-
gree or license as property, typically, they will consider the sup-
porting spouse's contribution to the student spouse's attainment of
his degree or license. Recognizing that marital dissolution is an eq-
uitable proceeding, the courts have fashioned remedies to prevent
clear inequities. Thus, while an attempt to characterize a profes-
sional degree or license as property may fail, the supporting spouse
has other remedies available.
In re Marriage of Graham"6 is the leading case following the
majority view that a professional degree or license does not consti-
tute marital property. In Graham, the wife supported the husband
and contributed substantially to his education throughout most of
the marriage.3 7 At the time of the dissolution, the parties had no
significant marital assets.38 Thus, the wife urged the trial court to
36. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75.
37. The length of the marriage was six years. For approximately three and one-half
years of the marriage, the wife worked as an airline stewardess while the husband obtained
an engineering degree and eventually an M.B.A. Shortly after the husband obtained his




Nelson: Treatment of a Professional Degree or a License in a Marital Dissolution
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1986
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
characterize her husband's professional degree as property which
the court should distribute. The trial court agreed, holding that
"an education obtained by one spouse during a marriage is jointly-
owned property to which the other spouse has a property right."39
. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that the defini-
tion of property was intended to be broad. "[I]t embraces anything
and everything which may belong to a man and in the ownership
of which he has a right to be protected by law."' 0 The court, how-
ever, also noted that there must be limits on what may be included
in the definition of property." The court refused to extend the
limits of the definition of property to include a professional degree.
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not en-
compassed even by the broad views of the concept of "property."
It does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable
value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It termi-
nates on death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be
assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced
degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous educa-
tion, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be ac-
quired by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellec-
tual achievement that may potentially assist in the future
acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the attributes
of property in the usual sense of that term.4"
Although the court held that the definition of property does not
include a professional degree or license, it did provide the support-
ing spouse a remedy. In dicta; the court noted that the trial court
could consider a spouse's contribution to the other spouse's educa-
tion in determining the property division or the amount of
maintenance. s
The New Jersey Supreme Court has expanded the reasoning
of Graham. In Mahoney v. Mahoney,"" the court noted that its leg-
islature also intended the term "property" to be broadly defined.'3
Yet, the definition was not so broad as to include a professional
degree or license.46 Although the court cited language from Gra-
ham, its major emphasis was on the speculative nature of a profes-
39. Id.
40. Id. at 432, 574 P.2d at 76 (quoting Las Animas County High School Dist. v. Raye,
144 Colo. 367, 356 P.2d 237 (1960)).
41. 194 Colo. at 432, 574 P.2d at 76.
42. Id., 574 P.2d at 77.
43. Id. at 433, 574 P.2d at 78.
44. 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
45. Id. at 495, 453 A.2d at 531.
46. Id. at 496-97, 453 A.2d at 532.
[Vol. 47
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sional degree. The court held that distribution of a professional de-
gree would require distribution of property that the student spouse
may never acquire. 7 In addition, it would involve distribution of
assets which would be acquired after termination of the marriage
rather than during marriage as required by statute. 48 Because the
value of a professional degree is so speculative and so personal in
nature the court concluded that treatment of the degree as prop-
erty would be unfair to the student spouse. 49 The court expressed
reluctance to treat the marriage as a "business arrangement in
which the parties keep track of debits and credits, their accounts
to be settled upon divorce."50
Similarly, the court in Mahoney recognized that the courts
must give some consideration to a spouse's contribution to the stu-
dent spouse's professional degree. "Marriage should not be a free
ticket to professional education and training without subsequent
obligations."51 Thus, the court held the equities of each case must
be examined and "where a spouse has received from his or her
partner financial contributions used in obtaining a professional de-
gree or license with the expectation of deriving material benefits
for both marriage partners, that spouse may be called upon to re-
imburse the supporting spouse for the amount of contributions
received."5
As an alternative theory, some supporting spouses have argued
that a remedy should be predicated on unjust enrichment.5 3 This
theory has not met with wide acceptance. The theory of unjust en-
richment carries with it notions of fault. At least one court has
stated that it will not "invite the introduction of evidence as to
who was at fault in the termination of the marriage before the
fruits of the degree could be realized.""
The Washington Supreme Court has provided the most com-
prehensive treatment of a professional degree in a dissolution pro-
ceeding. In Washburn, the court held that the provisions of Wash-
ington's Dissolution of Marriage Act 55 provide sufficient flexibility
to compensate the supporting spouse for contributions to the other
47. Id. at 497, 453 A.2d at 532.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 500, 453 A.2d at 533-34.
50. Id., 453 A.2d at 533.
51. Id. at 503, 453 A.2d at 535.
52. Id. at 505, 453 A.2d at 536.
53. See, e.g., Dela Rosa v. Dela Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard, 603
P.2d 747.
54. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d at 176, 677 P.2d at 157.
55. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.09.011-.09.902 (1986).
1986]
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spouse's education without defining a professional degree or license
as property.56 The court held:
When a person supports a spouse through professional school
in the mutual expectation of future financial benefit to the com-
munity, but the marriage ends before that benefit can be realized,
that circumstance is a "relevant factor" which must be considered
in making a fair and equitable division of property and liabilities
pursuant to RCW 26.09.080, or a just award of maintenance pur-
suant to RCW 26.09.090.57
The court did not provide a precise formula for dividing property
or awarding maintenance. Instead, it left this determination to the
discretion of the trial courts.5 e The court, however, directed the
56. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d at 1767, 677 P.2d at 157.
57. Id. at 178, 677 P.2d at 158. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (1986) provides:
In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage, legal separation, declaration
of invalidity, or in a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of
the marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse
or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court shall, without regard to
marital misconduct, make such disposition of the property and the liabilities of
the parties, either community or separate, as shall appear just and equitable after
considering all relevant factors including, but not limited to:
(1) The nature and extent of the community property;
(2) The nature and extent of the separate property;
(3) The duration of the marriage; and
(4) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of
property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family
home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to a spouse having custody
of any children.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.090 (1986) provides:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, declaration of
invalidity, or in a proceeding for maintenance following dissolution of the mar-
riage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the
court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse. The maintenance order
shall be in such amounts and for such periods of time as the court deems just,
without regard to marital misconduct, after considering all relevant factors includ-
ing but not limited to:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including sepa-
rate or community property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his needs
independently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child
living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable
the party seeking maintenance to find employment appropriate to his skill, inter-
ests, style of life, and other attendant circumstances;
(c) The standard of living established during the marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, physical and emotional condition, and financial obligations of the
spouse seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his
needs and financial obligations while meeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance.
58. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d at 179, 677 P.2d at 158.
10
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trial courts to consider the following four factors in exercising their
discretion:
(1) The amount of community funds expended for direct
educational costs, including tuition, fees, books, and supplies
(2) The amount which the community would have earned
had the efforts of the student spouse not been directed toward his
or her studies ....
(3) Any educational or career opportunities which the sup-
porting spouse gave up in order to obtain sufficiently lucrative
employment ...
(4) The future earnings prospects of each spouse, including
the earning potential of the student spouse with the professional
degree.59
These factors take into account both the supporting spouse's con-
tribution to the student spouse's education and the benefits which
the supporting spouse expected to derive from that contribution.
III. TREATMENT OF THE PROFESSIONAL DEGREE OR LICENSE IN
MONTANA
In Montana, as in most jurisdictions, the division of property
in a marital dissolution rests on principles of equity. 0 Conse-
quently, the trial courts have much discretion in determining the
division of the marital estate. 1 Although the Montana Supreme
Court has never considered whether a professional degree or li-
cense should be included in the marital estate, it has held that
similar interests are property subject to division upon dissolution.
Both the goodwill of a business and a retirement or pension
plan have characteristics similar to a professional degree or license.
The Montana Supreme Court has held that both of these interests
are property subject to division upon the dissolution of a mar-
riage.6 2 The treatment of these two interests as property supports
the argument that a professional degree or license should be char-
acterized as property.
59. Id. at 179-80, 677 P.2d at 159. The court noted that one means of compensation
which might be employed would be to simply grant the supporting spouse "an equal educa-
tional opportunity at the student spouse's expense." Id. at 181 n.4, 677 P.2d at 159 n.4.
60. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202 (1985).
61. In re Marriage of Martens, - Mont. 637 P.2d 523, 526 (1981). "Sec-
tion 40-4-202 is flexible and it vests a good deal of discretion in the District Court. . .. We
have stated, before and after the adoption of the statute, that each case must be looked at
individually, with an eye to its unique circumstances."
62. Holston v. Holston, - Mont. - , 668 P.2d 1048 (1983); In re Marriage of
Laster, 197 Mont. 470, 643 P.2d 597 (1982); Kis v. Kis, 196 Mont. 296, 639 P.2d 1151 (1982).
1986] 459
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The Montana Supreme Court has not provided extensive rea-
soning in holding that a retirement or pension plan is property
subject to division upon dissolution of the marital relationship.
The court has simply stated that it is property subject to divi-
sion."3 Like a professional degree or license, a retirement or pen-
sion plan typically cannot be transferred to third parties. In addi-
tion, a retirement or pension plan represents the right to future
income. However, unlike a professional degree or license, a retire-
ment plan is not subject to the degree of speculation that is char-
acteristic of a professional degree or license. Further, the right to
specified future benefits from a retirement plan vests at some
point in time, while the right to future benefits from a professional
degree or license never vests. Realization of the benefits of a pro-
fessional degree or license depends on the continued efforts of the
holder. Simply stated, no exact point in time can be identified as
the moment when the holder of a professional degree or license is
guaranteed that a specified economic benefit will result from the
professional degree or license."'
In a recent decision, the Montana Supreme Court found the
goodwill of an anesthesiology practice to be property subject to di-
vision in a marital dissolution.6" The goodwill of a professional
practice resembles a professional degree or license in that both are
very personal, difficult to value, and usually not readily marketa-
ble. In Hull v. Hull, the court recognized the difficulties involved
in valuing good will, but did not consider that determinative. 6 The
court relied entirely on the Washington Supreme Court's reasoning
in In re Marriage of Fleege.6 7 In Fleege, the court held that diffi-
culty of valuation is not a sufficient reason to hold that the good-
will of a professional practice does not constitute marital prop-
erty."8 Relying on the language of Montana Code Annotated
section 40-4-202, which requires a consideration of a multitude of
factors, including "the opportunity of the parties for future acqui-
sition of capital assets and income, '"69 the Montana Supreme Court
63. See Hull v. Hull, - Mont. -, 712 P.2d 1317 (1986) (goodwill of a business is
a marital asset); Holston, - Mont. __, 668 P.2d 1048 (retirement plan is a marital
asset); Laster, 197 Mont. 410, 643 P.2d 597 (retirement plan is a marital asset); Kis, 196
Mont. 296, 639 P.2d 1151 (retirement plan is a marital asset).
64. Compare Kis, 196 Mont. at 300, 639 P.2d at 1153; Holston, __ Mont. at __,
668 P.2d at 1050.
65. Hull, - Mont. __, 712 P.2d 1317.
66. Id. at -, 712 P.2d at 1321.
67. 91 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979).
68. Id. at 330, 588 P.2d at 1140.
69. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(1) (1985).
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adopted the reasoning of Fleege.70
Hull could be very persuasive in arguing that a professional
degree or license should be considered marital property. The good-
will of a professional practice is much more analogous to a profes-
sional degree or license than a retirement or pension plan. Thus,
the Montana Supreme Court has moved very close to the position
that a professional degree or license is marital property.
The major factor which may undercut the persuasive authority
of Hull is that Hull relied on the reasoning of Fleege. The Wash-
ington Supreme Court decided Fleege before it decided Washburn.
The court in Washburn did not consider Fleege. Yet it adopted a
position with regard to a professional degree or license which is
contrary to the court's position with regard to the goodwill of a
professional practice. Thus, the persuasive authority of Hull is un-
dercut to some extent.
The Montana Supreme Court's treatment of a vested remain-
der interest may provide additional insight into the position the
court will take on the issue. In In re Marriage of Hill,71 the court
addressed the issue of whether a remainder interest should be in-
cluded in the marital estate. In Hill the husband argued that his
remainder interest in certain real estate should not be included in
the marital estate because it was subject to divestment.72 The
court held that "[w]hile the right to possession of a vested future
interest is postponed, it is still a property interest that can be dis-
tributed. '73 "[Slince such vested interest [can] be sold or otherwise
alienated, transferred or mortgaged, the property [has] a present
value and should be included [in the marital estate]. '74 The court's
reasoning does not condition its holding on the presence of the
above qualities in a remainder interest, but it does indicate that
those qualities were persuasive. Thus, the absence of those quali-
ties in a professional degree may be sufficient for the court to hold
that a professional degree is not marital property.
Ultimately, the Montana Supreme Court must decide if a suf-
ficient policy justification exists for including a professional degree
or license in the marital estate. The most compelling justification
for such a position is simple fairness. Most people would find it
unfair for one spouse to support a student spouse as he obtains a
professional degree or license and then be denied any of the ex-
70. Hull, - Mont. at -, 712 P.2d at 1321.
71. 197 Mont. 451, 643 P.2d 582 (1982).
72. Id. at 457, 643 P.2d at 586.
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pected benefits of that support when the marriage dissolves shortly
after the student spouse obtains the degree. Montana's existing le-
gal framework may have sufficient flexibility to address this prob-
lem without the need to characterize a professional degree or li-
cense as marital property.
Montana Code Annotated section 40-4-202 directs the trial
court to consider a number of factors in determining an equitable
division of the marital estate.
In making apportionment, the court shall consider the duration of
the marriage and prior marriage of either party; antenuptial
agreement of the parties, the age, health, station, occupation,
amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability,
estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties; custodial pro-
visions; whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to
maintenance, and the opportunity of each for future acquisition
of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the
contribution or dissipation of value of the respective estates and
the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit
75
These factors should allow a trial court to consider a spouse's pro-
fessional degree or license in dividing the marital estate. Thus, a
trial court should be able to consider the nonstudent spouse's con-
tribution to the other spouse's professional degree or license as
well as the failed expectations that result from the dissolution.
Even where the parties have not accumulated sufficient assets
to completely address the problem of fairness, Montana's mainte-
nance statute could be interpreted to resolve this issue. In Wash-
burn, for example, the Washington Supreme Court formulated a
reasonable approach to the problem under a statutory framework
similar to Montana's. Montana could use a similar formula to ad-
dress the unfairness of the typical situation without going so far as
to hold that a professional degree or license is marital property.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts do not agree that a professional degree or license con-
stitutes marital property. Yet, for the most part, the courts do
agree that a spouse's contribution towards the attainment of the
other spouse's professional degree or license should not be ignored.
If the Montana Supreme Court chooses to treat a professional de-
gree or license as marital property, it would be adopting a minority
position. Such a position would also run contrary to the very na-
75. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(1) (1985).
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ture of a professional degree or license. Further, the court can ac-
complish the same goals under Montana's existing statutory frame-
work without holding that a professional degree or license is
property.
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